We examine how long-term life insurance contracts can be designed to incorporate uncertain future bequest needs. An individual who buys a life insurance contract early in life is often uncertain about the future …nancial needs of his or her family, in the event of an untimely death. Ideally, the individual would like to insure the risk of having high future bequest needs; but since bequest motives are typically unveri…able, a contract directly insuring these needs is not feasible. We derive two equivalent long-term life insurance contracts that are incentive compatible and achieve a higher welfare level than the naïve strategy of delaying the purchase of insurance until after one's bequest needs are known. We also examine the welfare e¤ects of such contracts and we show how third-party …nancial products, although bene…cial to the individual in the short run, can be welfare decreasing over one's lifetime
Introduction
People purchase life insurance to protect their dependents against …nancial losses caused by their deaths. In the life insurance market, most contracts extend many years into the future. Such prevalence of long-term contracts is partly due to the premium risk or "insurability risk." In particular, a person's health status may deteriorate, which makes short-term life insurance no longer a¤ordable in the future. In the extreme, a person's health could deteriorate to such an extent that no life insurance is available. A longterm insurance contract with a front-loaded premium schedule, in a certain sense, also provides insurance against this "insurability risk." However, even without such insurability risk, a long-term contract can be bene…cial. In particular, we show how such arrangements can improve welfare by partially insuring the risk of having a high bequest demand in the future.
Although it may be advantageous from an insurability standpoint to arrange for life insurance early, the need for life insurance many years later depends on the future demographic structure of the household and may not be known in advance. The impact of one's death often depends on the …-nancial condition of other family members, as well the future preferences of these family members, as examined by Lewis (1989) . Moreover, as shown by Bernheim (1991) , there is a demand by breadwinners to hold part of their assets in a solely bequeathable form, as opposed a form that could also be used for current consumption if one is alive.
Absent any insurability risk, it would at …rst appear to be optimal to purchase life insurance contracts later in life, when bequest needs are better known. Another possibility is to purchase short-term contracts and to adjust the insurance level as needed at a later date, as in Polborn et al. (2006) . If the status of one's health is private information, this runs into the problem of renewability risk. 1 However, even without the insurability risk, a short-term purchasing strategy for life insurance is not optimal.
Intuitively, although delaying the purchase of life insurance can help individuals to determine the appropriate level of insurance, in concordance with their known bequest demand, one must still pay the extra insurance premium if one's demand turns out to be high. That is, one must plan for the possibility of needing to spend more on insurance premia in the future. Note that this form of "premium risk" has nothing to do with the insurability risk.
Here the risk is on the budget required to …nance the required amount of life insurance; not on whether or not the premium rate is higher.
In this paper, we consider the design of a long-term life insurance contract that also can help to mitigate the risk of possibly having a high bequest need in the future. Our model is similar to that of Polborn et al. (2006) Since bequest needs are not likely to be easily veri…able, the contract cannot just pay a transfer to anyone who claims to have high bequests needs. Hence, the long-term contract is written with particular options, and the exercise of these options occurs via self selection. Long-term contracting also allows for any zero-pro…t condition to be implemented over the duration of the contract, rather than within each time period.
In the next section, we set up the basic model. We then examine a …rst-best world in which bequest type is veri…able. We examine the optimal insurance contract, which also provides protection again the risk of having a high bequest need in this setting. Next, we derive two equivalent longterm life insurance contracts for the case where bequest type is unveri…able.
These contracts are incentive compatible and achieve a higher welfare level than the naïve strategy of delaying the purchase of insurance until after one's bequest needs are known. These second-best contracts are also compared to the …rst-best case. We conclude by explaining how some relatively new third party …nancial products, especially so-called "life settlement" contracts, can upset this long-term contract arrangement.
The Model
We develop a simple three-period model of life-insurance purchases when individuals are uncertain about their bequest preferences. A person with initial wealth w 0 at date t = 0 learns of his preferences for bequest at date t = 1. The individual faces a probability q of death at date t = 2. With probability 1 q, the individual lives to consume another period. To keep the model simple and to focus on bequest needs, q is non-random and, thus, there is no insurability risk. For similar reasons, we further assume that the interest rate for borrowing or lending is zero.
Denote by w d and w l the individual's …nal wealth in the states of death and survival respectively. Let i refer to the individual's type with respect to preferences for bequest at t = 1. The expected utility of …nal wealth is then
where Bequest needs are initially uncertain. At t = 0, the individual does not know his bequest utility function, which can be either v B ( ) with probability or v A ( ) with probability 1 . We assume that v 0 B (w) > v 0 A (w) for all w, so that type B is the high-bequest type. An individual's type, once learned, is private information, but insurers know the proportion of types in the population. Any amount of life insurance coverage can be purchased at any time before t = 2. Let L be the death bene…t purchased. 4 The life 3 In this setting, we can view w 0 as the present value of lifetime earnings for this person, whom for simplicity we will consider as the sole "bread winner" for the family. Campbell (1980) . For a survey of many of these theoretical life insurance issues, see Villeneuve (2000) . 4 We ignore any savings component built into many life insurance contracts. In this insurance premium is assumed to be actuarially fair, so the premium for the amount of coverage L is qL.
As a preliminary step, we examine an individual's demand for life insurance when coverage is purchased at t = 1, after the individual has learned his type. We then show that, from the perspective of t = 0, the individual would like to insure against the risk of being a high-bequest type. However, insurance against such a risk cannot be bought directly, since one's type is unveri…able.
Bequest type is veri…able
Here we consider two insurance strategies. The …rst is simply to wait until bequest type is known before buying insurance. Even in a world with no insurability risk, the individual has a risk as to how much the total expenditure on insurance will be. In an ideal world, where bequest type is veri…able, this risk can be insured.
The naïve strategy
The simplest strategy for buying life insurance is to wait until t = 1 and to purchase coverage after learning one's type. It is useful to characterize the demand for coverage as a function of some arbitrary wealth w at date t = 1.
Obviously, if nothing has been done before this date, then w = w 0 .
For an individual with bequest type i and wealth w at date t = 1, the life-insurance objective is to
sense, we can regard L as the pure death-protection bene…t that is paid in the event of an early death at date t = 2. More simply, we can view the insurance as a type of term life insurance product that only pays a bene…t if death is at date t = 2.
The optimal coverage L i (w) satis…es the …rst-order condition
Risk aversion ensures that the second-order condition is satis…ed. It is easily
, B is indeed the high-bequest type.
Substituting for the optimal amount of coverage yields the date 1 optimal expected utility
Here V i (w) is the value function for a person of type i at date t = 1, who has wealth w at that date. Viewed from date t = 0 and treating bequest type as a random variable, V i (w) is a state-dependent utility function exhibiting risk aversion in each state of the world. To see this, apply the envelope theorem and use (1) to obtain
Since
. Di¤erentiating a second time yields
The sign follows from
where the expression is obtained by total di¤erentiation of (1).
From (3), it is also easily veri…ed that
Thus, bequest and net wealth in the survival state are normal goods, i.e., 
Insurance against bequest type
An individual who decides to wait until date t = 1 to purchase life insurance knows that he will purchase either L A (w 0 ) or L B (w 0 ), depending on his bequest needs. At date t = 0, his expected utility is therefore (1 )V A (w 0 )+
, transferring wealth at a fair price from the low to the high marginal utility state increases expected utility. Put di¤erently, the individual would like to insure against the risk of being a high-bequest type.
Suppose for now, contrary to our earlier assumption, that bequest types are veri…able. A contract could then be written at date t = 0 that pays some amount Q at date t = 1 if the person turns out to be type B. The fair premium for such a contract is Q paid at date t = 0. The date 1 wealth is now either w A = w 0 Q or w B = w 0 Q+Q depending on the individual's realized bequest type, where
It is a simple dynamic programming problem to maximize the expectation of the value function
The optimal Q satis…es the …rst-order condition
It follows trivially that Q > 0, so that w B > w 0 > w A .
The life insurance purchased is then L
if they are high. The possibility of insuring against bequest needs yields a solution characterized by
where
We essentially have a complete contingent claims market and equate marginal utility in all four possible states of the world. This is achieved by combining two types of insurance products: one insures against a premature death and the other insures the uncertain bequest needs. Coverage against the risk of being the high bequest type, equivalently the transfer of wealth from state
, the di¤erence in the life insurance premia. We will refer to this set of contracts as the …rst-best solution.
Comparison
It is instructive to compare this …rst-best solution with the naïve strategy Indi¤erence curves (iso-expected-utility) for both bequest types are shown.
For bequest type i, the marginal rate of substitution between wealth in the surviving state and wealth in the death state is
For each type, the equilibrium occurs at the tangency point with the budget Of course, direct insurance against bequest type is not feasible if one's bequest type is unveri…able. An individual purchasing such a policy would always want to claim that he is the high bequest type in order to receive the indemnity Q . This is obvious from …gure 2. Rather than staying at E A , a type-A individual is better o¤ claiming he is B and moving to the higher budget line.
Bequest type is unveri…able
We now turn our attention to the case where bequest type is private information and show how we can improve upon the naïve strategy of waiting until date t = 1 to purchase insurance. Note that it does not matter whether or not type is veri…able by the insurer to implement the naïve strategy.
Long-term life insurance contracts are purchased at date t = 0, before individuals know their bequest preferences. Many extant life insurance contracts often include provisions that allow for changes to the contract at some future date, at the option of the insured. One such type of provision is an opting out opportunity: the insured can trade-in his policy at a later date at some pre-speci…ed buy-back price. Alternatively, the contract can include an option for the purchase of additional coverage at some pre-speci…ed rate.
We show that such long-term insurance contracts can improve the individual's welfare even though bequest types are non-veri…able. In particular, a well designed policy allows wealth to e¤ectively be transferred from type-A individuals to type-B individuals.
Opting out contracts
We consider a contract with a sell back option. We de…ne the contract by the triplet (P; L; K), where P denotes the premium paid at t = 0, L denotes the death bene…t and K is the price at which the policy can be traded in (i.e. sold back to the insurer) at date t = 1. With insurers earning zero pro…t, if only type-A individuals sell back their policies, such a contract will e¤ectively transfer the amount qL K from type-A individuals to type-B individuals at date t = 1. In essence, the insurer sells the original coverage L at a subsidized price. The insurer …nances this subsidy by buying back the policy at an unfair price from the low-bequest types, who then subsequently purchase a lower level of coverage. 6 Such an arrangement works if the following three incentive-compatibility conditions are satis…ed: 6 As we show below in Proposition 2, the B-type contract provides more insurance than would be desirable with just a wealth transfer. Thus, the B-types have no desire to purchase more insurance at date t = 1. Indeed, they would ideally like to purchase less coverage at date t = 0, but are forced to over-insure in satisfying the constraint (7).
(a) type-A individuals choose to sell back their policy at t = 1 and buy a new short-term policy on the "spot"market at actuarially fair prices 7 :
(b) type-B individuals prefer keeping their policy at t = 1:
(c) From the perspective of date t = 0, the arrangement dominates the strategy of waiting until t = 1 to buy insurance:
where U denotes the expected utility provided by the long-term contract
In addition, the contract must yield a non-negative pro…t:
It is easily seen that the set of contracts that satisfy the above constraints is not empty. In particular, consider the contract de…ned by L = L B (w 0 ) and
, where L B (w 0 ) is the optimal death bene…t for type B under the naïve strategy. The non-negative pro…t condition and (8) are then satis…ed as equalities, and (7) is satis…ed as a strict inequality. Clearly, this arrangement yields the same outcome as the naïve strategy described in …gure 1, implying that (9) is then satis…ed as an equality.
In a competitive market, insurers are led to o¤er the best contract subject to pro…ts being non negative. The equilibrium contract is therefore the one that maximizes U de…ned as in (10) subject to the non-negative pro…t condition and the incentive compatibility conditions. Since it is a maximum, the optimal contract is at least as good as the naïve strategy, i.e., the constraint (9) is trivially satis…ed. Also, given K P , it is easily checked that (9) implies (8) . Thus, the only relevant constraints are (7), which is the opting out condition for type A, and the non-negative pro…t condition (11).
Second-best arrangement
Under the above arrangement, type A's wealth at date t = 1, after exercising his option to sell back his policy, is w A = w 0 P + K. This type then purchases the optimal death bene…t L A (w A ) in the date 1 market. This yields the …nal contingent wealth levels w 
subject to
and
The …rst inequality is type A's incentive compatibility constraint; the second follows from the insurer's non-negative pro…t condition.
It is straightforward to characterize the main features of the solution to the above problem. The resource constraint (13) is obviously binding.
We show …rst that the self-selection condition (12) must be binding as well.
Suppose, to the contrary, that the optimal solution maximizes U subject to (13) only. This is readily seen to yield a solution
Substituting from (1) and (2), we then have
which corresponds to the …rst-best allocation represented in …gure 2. However, as is clear from the …gure, type A strictly prefers E B to E A , implying that type A would not opt out, i.e., (12) is not satis…ed.
Secondly, the naïve strategy is not a solution. As discussed above, (12) holds as a strict inequality under the naïve strategy. Since this condition must bind, the naïve strategy does not solve the problem. However, since it nevertheless satis…es the constraints, it must be the case be that the individual is strictly better o¤ under the long-term contract. The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 1 Long-term opting-out contracts make individuals strictly better o¤ than the naïve strategy, but they remain second-best compared to the (complete-information) case where bequest needs are directly insurable.
Levels of coverage
We next examine how the levels of coverage di¤er under the various insurance arrangements. The Lagrangian of the second-best program is
with positive multipliers and . Together with (12) and (13) holding as equalities, the solution satis…es the …rst-order conditions
@L @w 
An illustration is given in …gure 3. We derive two results. First, the wealth transfer from type-A to type-B individuals in the long-term arrangement is smaller than in the …rst-best contract. Secondly, the second-best contract provides a greater death bene…t than type B would wish if he could purchase freely on the basis of his contractually de…ned date 1 wealth.
-- Fig. 3 about here --Wealth transfer. We show that the subsidy from type-A to type-B individuals is lower in the second-best solution vis-à-vis the …rst-best one:
From the zero-pro…t condition, the state wealth levels satisfy
Hence, (18) 
where the equality follows from the optimality conditions for a …rst best.
We now turn to the restrictions imposed by the …rst-order conditions.
From (14) and (15) it follows that
A ) which contradicts (19). The wealth transfer must therefore be strictly smaller in the second-best arrangement.
Distortion. Here we show that the B-type is forced to "overinsure," which can be interpreted as a type of signalling cost in the second-best setting. This distortion is represented by a point such as b E B in …gure 3. As drawn, the long-term contract provides a larger bequest (and correspondingly smaller survival wealth) than type B would wish to purchase voluntarily on the basis of the post-transfer wealth level b
. This is a necessary feature of the second-best arrangement. The intuition is that this "distortion" facilitates the transfer of wealth from state A to state B, by making it more costly for type A not to opt out of the initial contract.
To see this more formally, substituting from (15) and (16) yields
No "distortion" would require that the left-hand side is zero, which in turn The next proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 2 Under the second-best long-term contract (i) the wealth transfer between type A and type B is smaller than the …rst-best transfer and
(ii) high-bequest types are over-insured relative to the coverage they would like to have at the contractually de…ned wealth level.
The foregoing results imply that type-A's bequest and survival wealth are greater than in the …rst best, while type-B's survival wealth is smaller.
However, how type-B's bequest compares with the …rst-best level is ambiguous. There are two opposing e¤ects so to speak. On the hand, because of the distortion, B's equilibrium bequest is larger than he would wish at the wealth level b w B . On the other hand, his wealth level is lower than the …rst-best w B .
When conditional wealth levels do not di¤er too much from the …rst best, it may therefore be that B leaves a larger bequest. In this case, bequest by both types are greater than in the …rst best.
It is interesting to note that at date 1, an individual who turns out to be type A will be better o¤ with the second-best contract than with the …rst-best one. This is to be expected, since the subsidy is lower under the secondbest arrangement. In other words, at date 0 the individual would prefer the extra protection a¤orded by a larger subsidy. However, an individual who eventually turns out to be of a low-bequest type will be happier if the subsidy is smaller when date 1 arrives. 8 
Opting in contracts
An alternative to the opting out arrangement is to o¤er a contract with an option to purchase additional coverage at date t = 1. Such an "opt-in" contract is de…ned by the vector (P ; L; S; k) where P is the premium paid at t = 0 for coverage L and S is the optional additional coverage that the individual can purchase at date t = 1 for an additional premium k. If P > qL and k < qS, then wealth will be transferred from type-A individuals to type-B individuals, provided of course only type B exercises the option to purchase additional coverage. Here, the original coverage L is sold at an unfair premium. The non-negative pro…t constraint under this opting-in arrangement is
The above contract is equivalent to selling both types an initial contract with death bene…t (L + S) for a premium of (P + k). The type-B individual "opts in" by maintaining this package at date t = 1. The type-A individual refuses to "opt in" at date t = 1 by obtaining a refund of the extra premium k, and reducing the death total bene…t by an amount S. 9 As before, e¤ectively only the A-type's incentive compatibility constraint matters, with the type-A individual being just indi¤erent between opting in or not opting in.
it is easily seen that the non-negative pro…t constraint (21) is equivalent to the previous non-negative pro…t constraint (11) , and it will be satis…ed once again
with an equality at the optimum. We have one additional requirement here, namely that a type-A individual who would receive a refund qL+k at date t = 1 would purchase an optimal level of insurance coverage L A (w 0 P +qL) = L, if insurance would be available at a fair price. More formally, from the …rst-order condition for L A , this requires that
be satis…ed when L A (w 0 P + qL) = L.
It then follows in a straightforward manner that the same triple (P; L; K)
is optimal, which together with (22) and (23) determine the parameters for the optimal opt-in contract: (P ; L; S; k). Thus, the opting-in and opting-out arrangements are e¤ectively identical.
10
9 These opting in contracts have the property that the premium loading is collected in the …rst period, which is similar to the types of contracts that one observes for renewable insurance contracts when there is an insurability risk. Of course, the design in those models is for quite a di¤erent purpose; namely, to cope with asymmetry about one's risk type. 10 One can also verify this directly by writing out the incentive compatibility constraints and then …nding the optimal (P ; L; S; k) directly, which together with (23) shows the equivalence of the two types of contract arrangements.
This paper has shown how a long-term insurance contract can be designed, within a competitive insurance market, to insure the uncertain future bequest needs of the individual. We derived two equivalent forms for this long-term insurance contract: A life settlement contract essentially o¤ers to "buy back" the life insurance policy of an individual. This is e¤ected via a third party paying cash to the insured, in exchange for being named the bene…ciary of the life insurance death bene…t. Although this seems to eliminate any bene…t to the original bene…ciary, this will not be the case. In particular, under contract (i), the low-bequest need individual will opt to sell the policy to a life settlement broker, rather than back to the insurer, and receive more money for the policy. The insured can then purchase insurance at a fair price, since there is no insurability risk. Under contract (ii), both bequest types might purchase 11 These two forms will not be unique. For example, an intermediate level of insurance could be o¤ered with both "opt in" and "opt out" opportunities to achieve the same …nal wealth levels.
the additional extra insurance at the low price, with the low-bequest need type individual then immediately selling back the extra coverage in the life settlement market for a pro…t.
The existence of such markets provides an alternative for the insured that is bene…cial ex post (i.e., after signing the original long-term contract).
Insurance companies had originally protested as these markets developed, claiming that they should have the exclusive right to buy-back (i.e. "settle") contracts that they had written. But others disagree. For example, Doherty and Singer (2002) tout the bene…ts of life settlement markets to the insurance consumer. Such analysis might be incomplete, however, in that it excludes the fact that ex ante (i.e. prior to learning one's bequest type)
one would prefer the longer term contracts described in this paper; and the life settlement market might preclude such contracts from ever being o¤ered.
Although the long-term contracts we describe in this paper give the insurer monopoly power ex post, a competitive market ex ante should ensure that insurers cannot earn undue monopoly rents.
Obviously, we simpli…ed the setting of our analysis by assuming away many complicating factors, such as the insurability risk. This allowed our focus to be on the bequest needs and the (non-random) probability of death.
Integrating these results into more complex settings is di¢ cult. Hopefully, our paper takes a good …rst step in this direction. 
